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FROM BERKELEY TO HEGEL.

A CHAPTER OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY EMBODYING A CRITIQUE OF THE PANLOGIST PHASE OF IDEALISM.

τὸ δ' αὐτὸ ἔστω ἢ κατ' ἐνέργειαν ἐπιστήμη τῶν
πραγμάτων.—*Aristotle.*

ACCORDING to Schopenhauer, Berkeley is to be viewed as the “father of Idealism which is the foundation of all true philosophy,” a tribute which probably voices the opinion of a very large number of persons. In sober truth, however, this tribute is misleading. Plato, Aristotle (whose idealistic leanings Berkeley himself noted with approval¹), and Plotinus among the ancients; Descartes, Malebranche, etc., etc., among modern philosophers all had a share in the making of Idealism, and their claims to notice cannot be summarily dismissed in the fashion favored by Schopenhauer. Indeed, *modern* Idealism is a river with numerous sources. And Idealism *as a whole* is not only of great antiquity, but the forms which it has assumed are most varied. It cannot be traced back to any one originator. None the less, however, is the value of Berkeley’s work to be emphasised. We may well honor him as the first of modern thinkers who gave the ground-principle of Idealism its full due, asserting as he did *without show of reservation* that empirical Reality, as well “physical” as “mental,” is simply a presentment for consciousness. It is in championing this truth and exposing at the same time the fallacies of vulgar realism that his

¹ *Siris*, §§ 304-329.

permanent contribution to philosophy consists. Some luminous psychological work apart, his other achievements are of scant value and show poorly alongside the more thorough thinking of the Germans. His positive metaphysic inspired, it would appear, by his study of the Greeks and designed to proffer a merely improved rendering of the particular form of Theism current in his time, possesses no more than a historic interest. To-day even Idealistic Theists look for light not to Berkeley, but rather to the leaders of the Hegelian "Right." However, the obsolescence of the form of Theism, which he upheld, should in no way diminish our admiration of the beauty and force of his criticism of vulgar realism. If I may be allowed to cite what I have urged elsewhere, "He showed in sun-clear language that perception and its objects are inseparable; that the world is as truly suspended in consciousness as is the most subtle of thoughts or emotions. It is this emphatic preaching of Idealism which ennobles him. Others before him had been Idealists, but none gave so luminous a defence of their faith."¹ Idealism is, of course, a term of wide import embracing strangely opposed schools of thought, but it may be confidently averred that "subjective," "sceptical," "critical," "psychological," "panlogist," etc., etc., idealists will all alike, when pressed, concede their indebtedness to the stimulus given by Berkeley. Sometimes, it is true, we note a tendency to patronise the Bishop,—and Kant himself is not altogether innocent in this regard,—but the attempts deceive nobody. Well has it been said that but for Berkeley there would have been no Hume and but for Hume no Kant. Aye, and but for Kant,—Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Schopenhauer, and many of the leading idealists of to-day might never have caught the sparks that kindled their genius.

Δις καὶ τρὶς τὸ καλόν. In studying Berkeley one is apt to think him a "padder," a thinker who beats out a few grains of gold so as to cover acres. The answer is, of course, that he spoke as a pioneer; as an innovator who had to win adhesion to first principles before venturing to construct an elaborate system. Owing to the

¹ *Riddle of the Universe*, p. 51.

stupidity of his critics he had to waste time over the A B C of Idealism and to keep on restating one or two main points almost *ad nauseam*. That he felt desirous of completing a regular system we may fairly argue from the *Siris*, which certainly is an ambitious advance on the earlier works. But not even that advance, notable as in many ways it is, redeems his philosophy from sketchiness. "*Without is within*," says Berkeley. Let it be so, says Hegel, and philosophy has still to begin. The same things that were called *without* or *noumenal* are now called *within* or phenomenal, but, call them as you may, it is their *systematic explanation* that is wanted. Such systematic explanation, embracing man and the entire round of his experiences . . . is alone philosophy, and to that no repetition of without is within, or matter is phenomenal, will ever prove adequate."¹ Berkeley of course really says more than this, but it will scarcely be disputed that it is his "*without is within*" rather than his metaphysical constructions, few and faulty as they are, that gives him his influence in philosophy. His standpoint, owing to the sketchiness above noted is one of a class the antithesis of that including Hegel—it admits of presentation in a short space. He is a Nominalist, and disciple of Locke who starts from the "given"—from experience—yet with a wish as Churchman to get somehow satisfactorily beyond this "given." No word-jugglery, however, for him; the discipline of Empiricism has pruned that bias, he must think in the presence of the object, not of mere phantoms of verbal thought. The start, then, is from experience, viewed at first from a quite Humean standpoint,² but latterly from that of an individualistic idealism. "The world is my presentment," matter a general name connoting phases of objects which are themselves only "ideas" or modes of consciousness—this contention is driven home persistently. The doubt that the seemingly individual "Ego" may possibly have to be resolved into a Universal Ego does

¹ Hutchison Stirling Notes to Schwegler's *History of Philosophy*, p. 419, 8th edition.

² The Mind (Ego) is described in the *Commonplace Book* as a "congeries of perceptions"—only in a later stage as that which has the perceptions. It is, of course, this phase of Berkeley that Hume subsequently developed.

not trouble him. So far, then, so good. Seeing, however, that objects are ideas, modes of consciousness, why are they presented in the fashion in which we experience them? They appear, is the reply, not as mere modes of self-unfolding Egos, but as results of the working on these egos of a Divine Mind—of an intellect, an *actus purus*, in which the archetypes of all ideas of sense hang *realiter*. There is a multiplicity of subordinate individual Egos which know multiple worlds, all resolvable into shadowy ectypal phases of these luminous Archetypal Ideas. Berkeley tells us in the *Siris* that “sense implies an *impression* from some other being and denotes a *dependence* in the soul which hath it. Sense is a passion; and passions imply imperfection. God knoweth all things as pure mind or intellect; but nothing by sense nor through a Sensory” (*Siris*, § 289). Proceeding on these lines, he approximates to a system of Platonic Ideas upheld in a Supreme Idea, and transformed by it in part and obscurely to us individuals. Still there is a very notable contrast to be indicated. Berkeley’s IDEAS are in no way the empty abstractions re-ified by Plato; indeed, the worship of “Universals” (those makeshifts of our weak intellects striving to extend their empire by way of *symbols* and *words*) would have been inconsistent with his sturdy Nominalism. Such preposterous figments as “Likeness,” “Greatness,” “Smallness,” and like hypos-tatised attributes have no interest for him. Not shadowy Universals, but *concrete*, stable, unitary archetypes of the concrete but transient objects present in our *numerically different* worlds constitute his quarry. Thus the many Vesuvii present in the consciousness of human percipients are for him *ectypes* only of the complete *archetype* Vesuvius which obtains in the Divine Mind, and in which we share only in a most confused and imperfect manner. The solution is certainly compatible with Nominalism. The Berkeleyan Archetype is not a vague Platonic *abstraction*, such as “volcanicity” or “magnitude,” but a *particular*, though an exceedingly complex, object in the consciousness of God. And unlike Plato’s idle Universals, it is conceived as energising freely on us, thereby calling into reality the phenomenal or ectypal object we know.

The history of Idealism necessarily comprises that controversy

as to "Relations," latterly so emphasised, and, I must add, absurdly complicated and confused by German Epistemologists. Berkeley's attitude in this regard is instructive. At the outset of his thinking he was obviously too absorbed in his analysis of "Matter" and "visual space" to notice the as yet unexposed blemishes in Locke's Theory of Experience. He was content to view the development of perception out of space and time-ordered sensations much as did Locke, save that he laid more stress on what would be now called "Association" as interpreter of sense, and distinguished most ably between the space of our mature, and the space of our dawning, consciousness. Locke's obscurities touching "Ideas of Relation" in general seem to have at first quite escaped his notice. It is interesting, therefore, to detect in his later work, the *Siris*, gleams of what may almost be termed Kantian thinking, and the obvious weakening of his old sensationalist bias; a bias which in his case, as in many others, in no way impaired his loyalty to idealism. "Strictly the Sense knows nothing" (§ 253). "As Understanding perceiveth not, so Sense knoweth not" (§ 305). And how suggestively he alludes to the *tabula rasa* doctrine. "Some perhaps may think the truth to be this:—that there are properly no ideas or passive objects in the mind but what were derived from sense, but that there are also besides those *her own acts or operations*; such as notions" (§ 308). One is here within measurable distance of the Kantian Categories. I say measurable only because these notions are still present in the vaguest possible way and indeed grew wholly out of Berkeley's studies of Platonism (so markedly apparent in the *Siris*), not out of the so notably novel epistemological way of viewing things which yielded Kant's *Critique*. Still Berkeley evinces a distinct tendency to substitute *intelligi* for *percipi* as the support even of our ectypal imperfect worlds.

Idealism is the only possible form of a competent metaphysic, —this view, if left somewhat indeterminate, it is Berkeley's signal merit to have emphasised. But his Theological rendering of Idealism is faulty. The Berkeleyan Deity is advanced as a theologian's substitute for the "stupid, thoughtless somewhat" which Locke posited as the substance of objects and cause of our sensations.

And the positing of this Deity as *cause* of the said sensations involves an assumption, nowhere adequately vindicated by Berkeley, to wit., that of the transcendent validity of Causality, i. e. the belief that the notion of cause and effect can be used, not only within the confines of experience, but also to explain experience itself as *caused* by an agency or agencies beyond its pale. A consistent empiricism cannot accommodate this truly portentous assumption. That our sensations *must* have a cause beyond ourselves who have them is a view requiring close criticism. And that the cause is a Personal Deity, himself no *sensating* Ego but a purely *intellectual* being, who somehow affects us across a void, is a further development of hypothesis, open to still more exacting criticism.

In mooting his theory of Sensations Berkeley observes that their cause must be sought in spirit, "since of that we are conscious as active,—yet not in the spirit of which we are conscious, since there would be then no difference between real and imaginary ideas; therefore in a Divine Spirit." But it is not at all necessary to seek for the cause in the *conscious segments* of our Egos or "spirits," for nobody believes that we *consciously* originate our sensations. It may well be urged that the said Egos or "spirits," like Leibnitzian monads, evolve both their sensations and ideas out of themselves, *only attaining self-awareness or consciousness as result of their self-activity*. Berkeley himself admits that the Ego is not an "idea," but rather *that which has ideas*. Why, then, should not this veiled Ego produce sensations for itself and fusing with, and opposing to, these the requisite "imaginary" ideas, suspend a perfectly satisfactory microcosm within itself? Such a view would at least allow him to dispense with an uncritical *assumption* of the transcendent validity of Causality. He would not then depart from the closed circle of the individual Ego, for which the Experience, which has to be interpreted, obtains.

This Theological Idealism is, therefore, improperly established at the outset. Nor, while thus improperly established, does it constitute even a good working explanation of Reality. Exposition of a *coherent, slowly-unfolding world-whole*, in some way *common* to, and the *nursery of*, all percipients is denied us. The actual world, the

world known to science and "common sense," is for Berkeley only a series of transient perceptions in us and animals, an aggregate of phenomena that come and go in the consciousness of numerically different "spirits." Nature is a tangle of broken, one-sided, and very limited experiences in us and like dependent individuals; the history of the solar system, æons of which, as science and common sense hold, preceded the evolution of our consciousness, is demolished at a stroke. It may, indeed, be urged that Berkeley has posited an archetypal Nature in the Divine Mind; a Nature, the *esse* of which is not dependent on *percipi*, so far at any rate as men, animals, etc., are concerned; and that this Nature is competent to furnish a *full* explanation of the standing of the "ectypal" worlds we know. The difficulty, however, is to show how this *timeless* unitary and *complete* Nature is dovetailed with the *time-conditioned*, *numerically-different*, and miserably *fragmentary* Natures which are suspended in the consciousness of human and lower egos. We have here a problem which was never solved, or, to the best of my knowledge, even confronted by Berkeley.

We may here indicate a further difficulty, one, however, by no means peculiar to the theological idealism of Berkeley. What is the *ultimate ground* of the egos or "spirits" on which the Deity is said to imprint sensations? Is this ground God himself? Berkeley and some influential moderns are of this opinion. But surely it is absurd to posit any individual, however exalted, as the ground of individuals who in respect of their bare individuality are necessarily *other than* himself? One centre of consciousness may affect other centres of consciousness, but how is it that the latter are *in situ* to be affected at all? If, on the other hand, God is not the ultimate ground of the Egos we seem driven to accept Pluralism, or to posit a deeper principle of which Deity and the Egos are alike mere aspects, a principle not in itself conscious as prius, but withal the source of consciousness. And this last consideration opens up a theme of momentous importance with bearings not only on a passing system such as Berkeleyanism, but on the interpretation of Idealism for all time. It has been voiced in varied phases by many

writers ; for the present let us consider its purport in the regard of Berkeley.

That my or Smith's consciousness has had a history, that we as self-cognitive beings arose in time, is certain. Or to put the matter otherwise, at the present moment our Egos, in Berkeleyan phraseology, have "ideas," that is to say feel, think, and perceive. But feelings, thoughts, and perceptions are ever coming and going and if we trace their sequences back far enough we shall reach by inference a point when our Egos had *no conscious experience* at all. What, then, of these Egos posited as devoid of a consciously known content—as unprovided by Deity with sensations? Obviously we reach *consciousless centres* ; hence, if we wish to retain multiple Berkeleyan Egos, we must retain them not as conscious spirits, but rather as Leibnitzian monads, potentially but not necessarily always actually conscious. But this is not all. One of the great objections that wars against the Theism of Leibnitz wars against that of Berkeley. On what grounds is a *conscious* "Mind" posited as prius of the Reality imparted to these multiple Egos? If Berkeley requires an "active power," not inherent in the Egos themselves, to account for sensations, why must that Power be assumed as conscious rather than META-CONSCIOUS? If Experience is to be his guide, he ought not, of course, to overstep it by means of a notion (causality) borrowed uncritically from it. But even had his use of this Notion been vindicated, he ought to have borne in mind that Experience reveals every known conscious individual or "empirical ego" as *arising in time*, the actual as always a mere oasis in the potential, that our very perceptions of objects are replete with ideas of sensations which *may* be, but are not, realised, that the area of consciousness even in the case of a Titan of knowledge is always at any given moment most narrow. Experience in fact is all in favor of the Metaconscious as *prius* of the conscious, not, therefore, in favor of a Theistic Idealism. I am aware, however, that many neo-Hegelians view consciousness as the "form of eternity," and that Berkeley is on this count in very good modern company. By these thinkers, as by Berkeley, Reality, grasped in inadequate and inconsistent pieces by us, is viewed as all-together in a conscious God, a

self-thinking "Idea" for which potentiality is not. And the "Idea" thus championed is regarded as the *basis of advanced religion*, of that religion which has been defined as "philosophy speaking naïvely." It appears to me that this position is not only untenable on *philosophic* grounds, but of no service to *sentiment*, to advanced *religion*, "natural" or other. On the lines of idealistic Theism, the "Idea" must be the fountain-head of *all*, note it well, *all* cosmic activities. And surely we cannot soberly and honestly worship an "Idea" supposed to ideate cruelties, diseases, obscenities, and all the grim defects of this planet as phases of its complete reality! Is not the sneer of Schopenhauer relevant here? Is the "Idea" that "thinks" the drama of the snake and the squirrel, when something else might be thought, a fit object of reverence? Of a surety Dualism, not an idealistic-Theistic Monism, is the prop of the ordinary religionist.

Had Berkeley—I note one glimpse only in *Siris*, § 257—suspected that consciousness is only a flower on a stem fed by roots in the METACONSIOUS, he might have achieved a notable advance on his earlier theory of Matter. After all it is only against vulgar Realism with its re-ified Abstraction "Matter" that his idealist polemic holds good. As against "unperceived objects" alleged to be resisting extensions inhering in a surd "substance," it is decisive enough. But as against such objects viewed as *potential modes of consciousness*, as metaconscious spiritual activities, it is irrelevant. For instance a Nature-philosophy such as that of Schelling may well posit objects that have never yet been, and indeed may never be, mirrored in the consciousness of percipients, and nevertheless maintain its idealism intact. Aristotle (who verges on Absolute Idealism) identifies, it is true, *actual* knowledge with what is known, but he does not for all that make my teapot's whole standing dependent on my passing perceptions. He backs the actual with the potential.¹ Berkeley's error here was to place all movement solely within

¹ If Aristotle's standpoint is to be attained, the distinction between potential existence (*ἐν δυνάμει*) and actual existence (*ἐν ἐντελεχεία, ἐν ἐνεργείᾳ*) must always be borne in mind. *Actual* knowledge for him coincides with the *thing* known, but, nevertheless, the thing when unknown may possess a potential existence quite independent of our consciousness. It is to be noted, however, that Aristotle does not

consciousness—in the actual—ignoring the alternative that the well-springs of consciousness may be traced to the *Metaconscious*, (whether logically symbolised or otherwise). Hence his belief that his Idealism was to sound the death-knell of Atheism and Scepticism. He destroyed and rightly destroyed the philosophers' "Matter," and showed that an extra-experiential ground of objects, if we are to conceive *or even discuss one at all*, must be posited as *spiritual*. What he overlooked was the consideration that spiritual activities—the only admissible ground—may be not only conscious but meta or super-conscious. This oversight is sharply rebuked by the subsequent history of philosophy. Thus Schopenhauer is an admirer of Berkeley, is strictly *idealist*, but a votary to all intents and purposes of that very *Atheism* which the Bishop so strenuously sought to overthrow!

So much, then, for the positive metaphysic of Berkeley. Idealism changes its garb with Hume. He is Berkeley *minus* the Divine Mind and the subordinate Egos, professes to view Experience, inner and outer, as a stream of atomistic "perceptions" or states. Locke's old theory of "Relations" is worked out to the bitter end—the current empiricism exploited to the full—a general "loosening" of Reality effected. We may term him an Agnostic Idealist, and note with interest his influence on Kant, which, by the way, extended to other issues than the Causality-problem mentioned by the Königsberg philosopher. The Dryasdusts of university chairs are apt to dwell too exclusively on the more academic phases of Hume's thinking. His contributions to philosophy in general have proved of great value to later writers, including agnostics and metaphysicians alike, classes of thinkers who do not usually drink at the same fountain.

The next step in Idealism we find in Kant. What, in brief, is his standpoint? It is a novel subjective idealism (qualified by a sometimes hesitating acceptance of "things-in-themselves"), allied with a *Thought-Theory* of Experience, vaguely, very vaguely antici-

carry this doctrine of potentiality as far as he might have done, for his Ultimate Creative Intellect or Deity is *actus purus*, completely actual or conscious.

pated by Berkeley (*vide supra*). On Kant's showing, Sensations unified in Space and Time are subsumed under *a priori* Notions or Categories and forthwith emerge as Experience, as that very Real World, back to which the psychologists had traced the sources of knowledge. Empirical realism is taught, for are not objects immediate facts, transcendental idealism, for these facts again are but modes of a knowing consciousness. Experience is constituted by necessary relations, but cannot be transcended. Touching soul, rational cosmic lore and Deity, we must, as speculative reasoners, be agnostic. Still, despite Kant's speculative agnosticism, the germs of a Hegel are here—Categories or Concepts, though not yet worked up into a system, appear as *prius* of Nature and the inner psychological order or "Mind." Kant is puzzled, it is true, when he deals with the *crux* of the rise of sensations, failing which he says, Categories are empty; but the resort to occult Things-in-themselves to account for them is obviously erroneous. On his own showing Causality must not be used transcendently—his Idealism is debarred from flying to surds of this kind. Has he not also proclaimed the need of deducing all reality from a single principle? Eager to demolish the belief in Things-in-themselves and to deduce Reality from the required single principle, uprises Fichte and spins Reality, sensations, space, time, and the categories alike out of Kant's pure Ego now exalted to the rank of an *Absolute Reason* or I as Universal, as the ground of all modes of empirical consciousness. The Absolute Ego posits a non-Ego within itself—reflects itself into itself—makes itself its own object that it may realise its freedom *in concreto*—hence a world and individuals driven by the moral law to abolish this world. Fichte's doctrine of perception is not subjective idealism proper; he places Reality only in the Absolute common Ego. The Things-in-themselves are repudiated, hence Epistemology and Ontology kiss one another. Nature is ideally real, reflects only obstructed activities of this Ego, possesses in fact no show of independent standing. To empirical individuals this Nature necessarily seems foreign, yet, after all, it is but a self-limitation of the Universal Reason revealed in and bottoming them. This solution, plausible in many ways, will not,

however, enable us to rethink science satisfactorily. Ideal-Realism requires an amendment, and Schelling comes forward as propounder of one. Mind and nature, ideal and real, are by him treated as having equal claims to recognition, as sides of an underlying Unity—we have the system of Absolute Identity. Schelling's Absolute, however, is no Spinozist indeterminate Substance, but rather Fichte's Absolute Ego or *Reason*, and of this mind and nature are revelations of coequal standing. One of Schelling's signal merits is his development of the doctrine of "unconscious intelligence" (first prominently espoused by Leibnitz among moderns), which enables him to assert a world-order prior to consciousness and to give Nature generally a free swing without prejudice to idealism. The thing-in-itself *as surd* is no more present here than with Fichte; but besides objects presented in actuality as lit up by consciousness there are to be admitted objects in potentiality as "unripe intelligence." This objective "Real-Idealism" admits that the object may be in itself far richer than the object as mirrored in consciousness, and further views consciousness itself with its ideal and real aspects as emergent in a time-process from Nature. It is in the human brain that Nature first returns fully on herself, "whence it is clear that Nature is primarily identical with that which is realised as consciousness and intelligence." On the side of the latter the "ideal," on that of Nature the "real," aspect of the Absolute Reason is dominant. On these positions hinges that part of Schelling's theory of Perception which has materially influenced his successors. Details and later developments must be omitted. Passing on to Hegel, we note the complete exploitation of the Category-theory of Experience broached by Kant and absorption and amendment of previous idealist standpoints generally, which invite close attention. No one now, I presume, regards either Fichte or Schelling in the light of infallible Masters, however illuminative they may prove, but on the contrary many of our most acute modern thinkers are practically disciples of Hegel. Indeed, Panlogism is viewed by many critics as destined to stand or fall with his system. It may, therefore, prove of interest to dwell at some length on his standpoint and subsequently to indicate in what directions success-

ful amendments of it have been made, or are likely to be made in the future. The first requisite, however, of any advance is full realisation of the stage one has to leave behind. Let me endeavor, therefore, to trace briefly according to my lights the leading causes which seem to have mediated the imposing structure of Hegel. This structure embodies, to my thinking, one of the greatest delusions of philosophy—that of the Concept viewed as *prius*—a theory which has led countless inquirers astray, and justifies in great measure the bitter polemic of a Schopenhauer. Nevertheless, the delusion colors much of ancient, and more still of mediæval and modern speculation. To assail it effectively, one must confront it in its most definite and pronounced form. Hence Hegel's importance for critics. He is nothing, if not a Panlogist, and in assailing him we assail Panlogism in its most ambitious form; in Hegel, in fact, we confront the protagonist of exploiters of the Concept,—of that standpoint which upholds Reason as *prius* of reality. We are all familiar with his amazing grasp of Method and unflinching championship of Reason as “sovereign of the world.” And most of us would probably admit that, if Reason is really sovereign, his system must on all fundamental counts be right. Reason will probably never find a more interesting and methodic champion than Hegel, indeed most philosophic advocates of the sovereignty of Reason view his *Logic*, *Nature-philosophy*, and *Philosophy of Spirit* as in general outlines valid, though they may need, and notably the Nature-philosophy, extensive alterations in the matter of details. Hegel, therefore, is the special objective of those who, like myself, reject reason as *Prius*.

I do not propose here to summarise Hegelianism. The articulation of that system is such as scarcely to admit of a summary. Assuming my readers' conversance with the system, I shall first note very briefly the source of its germinal ideas and then indicate various leading points touching which the Metaphysic of the future must, in my opinion, oppose it.

“Kant's Categories form really the Substance of Hegel” observes Dr. Stirling. And obviously the system would be meaningless to all who have ignored Kant. Categories viewed as logical

articulation of the Idea as timeless *prius* in the "Logic"; categories viewed as externalised in the contingent particularity of Nature (that *ratio mersa et confusa*), categories viewed as realised in the at-one-ment of the Idea with itself as Mind or Spirit—surely these universal thought-forms or notions are indeed the "substance" of Hegel. But the "substance" thus accurately indicated has "modes" which a mere reference to Kant will not, of course, account for. Hegelianism as avowedly a synthesis, the "truth" of a series of varied world-historic standpoints, had to include much more than Kant. And it is here that an illuminative fact crops out. While nominally inclusive of all the standpoints, Hegelianism absorbs some with peculiar relish. Prominent among these are those of Plato and Aristotle. Plato's Universal or *Idea* is no doubt so formal as to be only attained at the cost of sacrificing and really leaving unexplained the concrete spheres of "world" and "mind" we know. But for all that it is a bold, if in many ways, halting attempt to exhibit the concept as *prius*, and on that account specially stimulating to an avid student of Kant such as was Hegel. *Here* in Plato was the inadequately realised but most suggestive endeavor to identify reality with Thought; *there* in Kant's category-doctrine (when amplified and dialectically developed) lay the secret of how the identification was to be effected. The stimulus once given, rationalisation of the entire range of Reality as we have it—to the exclusion of all the old surds—became the ambition of the German thinker. "It may be admitted," writes Dr. Stirling, "that there are in Plato partial efforts towards a single plastic element or energy, a single all of thought, whose distinctions were constitutive pairs of fluent notions." And we shall further recall that belief in a *relationship* of notions or concepts, which admits of logical passage from one to the other *without reference to crass fact*, is an undeniable position of Plato. Dialectic as treating of the relations of these notions is also his ontology. The standing of the flux of nature and mind as explained by Hegel was also in part probably suggested by Plato. Categories, the unitary universal notions "realising themselves in multiplicity," as projected into the sphere of crass contingent phenomena, recall the Platonic notions which appear as if

broken into a manifold in their shadowy copies in the sense-world. Much else offers itself for mention, but enough has been said to enable us to enter a preliminary caution. If the headquarters of Hegel lie in Plato, and if, as we know, Plato is *the* philosopher of *abstractionism*, suspicions must arise that the contaminated headwaters have carried their infection far down stream. And these suspicions are to my thinking validated by facts. Great as Plato has been as a stimulus to thought, he is avowedly an abstractionist of the most daring kind, and the *abuse of notions* traceable to him has, I believe, fouled the whole history of philosophy, but most notably that part claiming Hegel and the Hegelians. Let us consider for a moment the genesis of the notion-controversy and realise out of what really trivial antecedents this exaggerated respect for the "labor of the notion" arose. Let us go back to Socrates. In quest of the clarification of men's thoughts with a mainly ethical end,—clear knowledge implying for him virtue,—what did he effect? He did nothing (his personal influence apart) but teach men by way of rigid definition and the "irony" that their *verbal thinking* was confused and that the attainment and use of names with clearly thought applications and implications was imperative. The clarified concepts which he ushered into use came however insensibly and by a natural illusion to seem more real than the particulars to which they referred—they were the wheat of reality, the rest was chaff. Hence Plato (with an eye also to reconciling current systems or rather patches of thought) *hypostatized*, and extended them, and finally set up a Dialectic or Ontology touching their "intelligible" relations. Hence again arose the modifications introduced by Aristotle, endless mediæval disputations and the later notion-philosophies, the upshot of which has been the darkening of the problems treated in a manner that has tended to make all metaphysic seem ridiculous, a "splendid folly" as a famous agnostic would put it. There can be little doubt that on the fatal hypostasis of the concept and the preposterous importance attached to concepts generally—an importance which their abstractness should never allow us to overrate—rests the responsibility for most of the existing disgust with metaphysic. In view of the known inadequacy

of *content* of concepts considered in relation to their concrete objects, we ought to require very strong evidence before invoking concepts *of any kind* in plumbing the source of Reality. The danger of mistaking the shadow for the substance is obvious. Concepts of the empirical kind are only of value in so far as they facilitate our grasp of presented or re-presented Reality ; they are a delusion and a snare if made ends in themselves and give rise to the word-juggler and schoolman. The "Universals" of the metaphysician must, therefore, be viewed with suspicion at the outset.

The hints gleaned by Hegel from Aristotle were numerous. The timeless Creative Intellect, the "eternally complete" active Reason which is ground, support, and presupposition of thoughts and things, the doctrines of form and matter and drift towards Absolute Idealism, the immanence of Universals in things explanatory of the world-stir (from which Plato's inert Ideas, like epicurean gods, had been clumsily held aloof), the soul as realising essence and "truth" of body, the allocation of a domain to "chance," (as opposed to rational productivity) in the world-order ; the view that the higher manifestation may include the lower, and that the last in time may be the metaphysical first, and many other points deserve mention. The Aristotelian doctrine that Universals indwell and energise in things, amending the Platonic view, curiously recalls the post-Kantian treatment of the categories amending the view of Kant—categories being made immanent in, instead of being superimposed on, phenomena. This, however, by the way.

To be aware of the inspiring ideas of any given system, is to have in large part explained it. Any thinker with a long life and ordinary industry is capable of developing his standpoint in the detail, but he does not ordinarily add much to the stock of germinal ideas with which he sets out. Hence the fundamental importance of tracing the pedigree of these ideas. In the case of Hegelianism, the germinal ideas bearing on Panlogism seem to proceed almost wholly out of Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Fichte, and Schelling. And of these masters the two former, at any rate, are both tainted with *formalism*. Not unreasonably, then, should we anticipate that "misleading stress on the abstract universal," with which even Dr.

Stirling charges the Hegelian Logic. The most influential teachers of Greece, more reliable guides in the view of Hegel's contemporaries than they are for us, must have inoculated him effectually with the bias.

Originality, it has been well said, consists in first absorbing other people's thoughts.¹ Hegel's indebtedness to Kant's "Analytic" and "Dialectic," to Fichte's Transcendental deduction and transformation of the categories into conditions of experience posited by Absolute Thinking, to Schelling's objective idealism, potency-scheme, and view of the world-history as revelation of the Absolute, etc., etc., and to Jacob Bohme, is notorious. If he developed much, he received much. His rehabilitation of *Reason* as against the later mysticism of Schelling, his improvements and striking use of the Dialectical Method, and his attempt to rethink, (and to exhibit the sovereignty of Reason in) all the main departments of Human Experience constitute his striking work. I shall now briefly consider some of the leading objections which bear upon his positions, more especially as interpreted by the conservatives of the Right wing of his school. Space will not allow me to exhaust these objections, but I trust that the defects of treatment which may be observable, will be accompanied by suggestions of compensatory value.

THE PROBLEM OF THEISM.

As interpreted by the Hegelian Right, the Idea is a *conscious* Prius, an intelligible unitary actuality as opposed to a mere potentiality or "initselfness" of subjectivity. We arrive thus at Green's "eternally complete" consciousness; only time-severed patches of the rational whole constituting its content being revealed to us empirical individuals, each of whom, however, reproduces aspects of the rational whole in his mind and comes in time to recognise *explicitly* as rational what was ever *implicitly* this. In the course of this reproduction it "uses the sentient life of the soul as its organ" (Green, *Proleg. to Ethics*). A thinker of this school would,

¹ Professor Nicholson.

no doubt, agree heartily with Schopenhauer's remark, "An impersonal God is no God at all but a misapplied word." And it must, I think, be conceded that a Hegelian who professes a religious conservatism, but declines withal to admit that the Idea as *prius* is conscious, is in an awkward quandary. If one thing is more certain than another, it is the fact that conservative religionists in Europe, rightly or wrongly, require the retention of a *conscious personal* God as the author and sustainer of Reality. An impersonal fontal Reason may do duty as the basis of an Idealistic *Atheism*, but proffered as the philosophical rendering of the Christian's God it is absurd.

There are, however, so-called Hegelian Theists who, while accepting an Impersonal IDEA or REASON as *prius*, profess to find God in the "Absolute Idea," that is to say in the Idea or Reason as realised or *made explicit* in philosophy, art, science, and history as a whole, an unfoldment which is realised in its turn through "finite spirits," such as we. I fail, however, to see in what manner a God of this kind can be regarded as constituting the ideal of the religionist, the man who attends churches, and believes in the efficacy of prayer, and the variety of dogmas embraced under the name of Christianity. But let this pass. I have now merely to point out that such a God cannot be regarded as either infinite or necessarily eternal. Not infinitude but (if I may use the term) indefinitude "foams from the goblet" of a "spirit-empire" realised through individuals. As the "finite spirits" come and go, advance and decline, so, too, must this God wax and wane. He is subject to so low a category as Quantity. However numerous and advanced the "finite spirits" may be, they could always be conceived as more numerous and more advanced, and the "spirit-empire" consequently as susceptible of fuller development. God would, therefore, never *exhaust*, never fully realise in Himself the infinite potentialities of manifestation latent in the Impersonal Reason, would, therefore, be only indefinite, not infinite. And His eternity would be assured only on the supposition that the eternity of the world-process also is assured. A *Maha-pralaya*, such as that of which Hindu mystics dream, would extinguish Him. For clearly a God

who is real only through mediation of "finite spirits" must lose consciousness when the latter lose consciousness.

The theory of a *conscious* fontal Reason is attended with difficulties of another kind. At the outset we must observe that there is no scope for dogmatic assertion in this controversy. Hegelians profess only to explain experience and a Theistic Idealism is merely one among various hypotheses which may serve to explain it. We only know directly our own states of consciousness. The problem is,—Does the reality of this consciousness force us to infer a creative god-consciousness as its ground, or is there a more effective hypothesis forthcoming?

Now I must urge here, as I have already urged elsewhere, that no one individual however exalted serves to explain the origin of other individuals. A conscious God is in virtue of His very self-awareness or consciousness *cut off* from the spheres embraced by the consciousness of other individuals. Even were He conscious of all that of which these other individuals are conscious, He would still remain only the leading monad in a hierarchy of monads. All selves in respect of their bare self-hood are discrete impervious ultimates: We can speak in Hegelian language of a *known* object as "an other which is not another," but not so of an alien *knower*. All Selves are selves "in their own right," though they may greatly further or hinder one another's activities. We must posit, in fact, a principle other than a God-consciousness as ground of ourselves, that is if it is necessary to posit a ground at all.

The Ultimate ground of Reality, it would seem, has to be found in what I have elsewhere termed the Metaconscious, a spiritual activity *ὑπέροσος ὑπέρωσ* best discussed as the basis of a monadology. All available clues seem to indicate that consciousness (i. e., spiritual activity under the form of self-awareness) is a *posterius*, never a *prius*, that, in fact, the actual is only a star-point visible against the dark background of the potential. Consciousness has a very limited range; its content streams ever out of potentiality into actuality; only the veriest fragment of our experiences, perceptual and mental, is present to us at any given moment, while perception itself is possible only in virtue of associated ideas

of *unrealised* sensations. In fact, reflexion on the features of our individual experience —the *datum* on which metaphysic necessarily founds—makes for the theory of the Metaconscious. Consciousness, the actual, is the flower, not the root.

One would like, on the Theistic assumption, to have one more riddle answered. If God is held to be source of my consciousness, how can it be urged that He was complete before my rise? It would be absurd to hold that my *consciousness* was suspended in his “eternally complete” consciousness without my being aware of the fact. Here at least, then, potentiality would seem to eclipse actuality, here a conscious God is eternal along with a somewhat that was once not conscious at all. I at least became conscious in time. Did I then spring from a metaconscious ground of which God knew naught?

It is hard that Conservatism should reap no harvest. But the uselessness even to Theology of this Hegelian Theism is well pointed out by Mr. Balfour, “Neither the combining Principle alone, nor the combining principle considered in its union with the multiplicity which it combines, can satisfy the requirements of an effectual Theology. Not the first, because it is a barren abstraction, not the second, because in its all-inclusive universality it holds in suspension, without preference and without repulsion, every element alike of the knowable world. Of these none, whatever be its nature, be it good or bad, base or noble, can be considered as alien to the Absolute ; all are necessary and all are characteristic.” The worthlessness of this Theism to the average worshipper will be, perhaps, still more vividly realised when it is remembered that Hegel viewed religion as God’s self-consciousness,¹ and that such atrocious cults as the religions of the Syrians and Phœnicians, the so-called “religions of pain,” figure as moments of the dialectic of religions (culminating in the absolute religion or Christianity). Can we wonder that some writers have used angry words in discussing Hegelianism? Can we be seriously asked to worship a Being who unfolds

¹ Religion = “the knowledge which the Divine Spirit has of himself through the mediation of the finite spirit.” (Hegel.)

His "eternal essence" in a time-process which yields the abominations of Moloch and Adonis, to ignore more primitive and in some cases even more cruel cults? Can the clerics of the "Absolute Religion" honestly inculcate a "philosophical Theism" which embraces this monstrous view? We may, however, press the point further and contend that *all idealistic Theisms alike are unsatisfactory*. On the shoulders of a Deity, *who is sole prius*, rests the responsibility for every event which our moral judgment deplores. Every iniquity of man, for instance, must in consistency be traced back to this Deity, for what for such a Theism are individuals but His manifestations? We cannot see in a Nero anything but a phase of his activity. "Un être qui a tout reçu, ne peut agir que par ce que lui a été donné, et toute la puissance divine qui est infinie, ne saurait le rendre indépendant," runs a passage culled by Schopenhauer from Vauvenarques and the passage is singularly relevant. The advance of ethical ideals must render such a Theism unwelcome, if not objectionable. The philosophy which professes to "rethink" Christianity on conservative lines such as these will one day be viewed as an imposture.

THE PROBLEM OF THE RATIONALITY OF THE PRIUS.

Whether the prius is or is not conscious is after all a matter of debate even among Hegelians. All, however, of these latter who have any real claim to their title contend for its *rationality*, and no student of Hegel can doubt *his* view for a moment. Now this exaltation of Reason stands for the culmination of the formalist Platonic movement already noticed. A unity of intelligible categories is discussed as timeless *prius*, the logical articulation of its moments being painfully demonstrated. In this dialectical process we confront, so it is said, the "pure reason"—God in his eternal essence as ground of reality. And in these categories we have to note the Idea-determinations which underlie nature and the individual mind, viewing them in a dry light abstracted from the multiplicity and confusion in which they appear in actual experience. A masterly ambition, this Logic; a masterly Method, too, it would seem, this method of the "self-explicating Idea," carrying us from category

to category with an oily, if painful, sureness. But now that we have plumbed the riddle of the Idea as *prius* let us away to the concrete of Nature and mind. And what do we find? That the Reason into whose very movement we had seemed to enter, now often plainly avails us nothing. We cite pessimists galore who point to the interminable failures, abominations, and torments of this world, and are told in reply that these evils are mostly necessary to bring out the full glory of the godhead of the Idea. But some evils at least are utterly indefensible on any such teleologic lines; so Hegelians call in an ally and eke out Reason by aid of the sound "contingency." No one, however, is able to say *how* Reason, the all-sufficient *prius*, founded a world of "contingent" particularity which so often suggests unreason, but that for Hegelians is a trifle. Suffice it, they urge, that we are able to detect the presence of Reason here and there in the turmoil. We are to trust to the wisdom of the Idea that the pother will make eventually for good—the good *of the Idea*. Of a truth Nature on the showing even of advocates of the IDEA is a very bad exemplification of Reason. To cite Schwegler's description of the Hegelian Nature, that amazing output of Rationality: "Nature is a Bacchantic God, uncontrolled by, and unconscious of, himself. It offers, then, *no example* of an intelligibly articulated, continuously ascendant gradation. On the contrary, it everywhere mingles and confounds the essential limits by intermediate and spurious products which perpetually furnish instances in contradiction of every fixed classification. In consequence of this impotence on the part of nature to hold fast the moments of the notion, the philosophy of nature is constantly compelled, as it were, to capitulate between the world of the concrete individual products and the regulative of the speculative idea" (*History of Philosophy*, translated by Hutchison Stirling. Eighth edition. Page 332). Seeing that the Idea as *prius* is viewed as *pure reason* and nothing else, and further as *in no way exhausted* by its manifestation as Nature, we must be at a loss to account for the above extraordinary output. And our perplexity is increased when we reach the sphere of "Philosophy of Mind" or Spirit—the very inquiry which, treating of the regress of the Idea into itself, might be ex-

pected to shatter scepticism. It would puzzle even a sophist to exhibit the domains of (what Hegel discusses under) "Anthropology," "Phenomenology," and "Psychology" as of purely rational import. So-called "Objective Reason," again, as realised in the State, etc., would be often much more appropriately dubbed unreason. At its best it is only an imperfect result of innumerable faulty tentatives. And even in the vaunted history of philosophy itself the Categories of Reason show but poorly. There are apparent "distortions in time," big gaps, etc., on the admission of Hegel and of his own supporters, the deftest manipulations of data notwithstanding. Here again phenomenal "contingency" destroys all hope of any concrete vindication of what logic—rightly held the "realm of shadows"—has established. Yet Logic pretends to discuss the *Prius* of that very contingency and believes itself to have done so satisfactorily! We can appreciate now the indignation of Schopenhauer, and the sneers of Schelling and von Hartmann. When unravelling the real ongoings of the real world and of the minds of those conceived as in it, the so-called labor of the "Notion" or "Concept" only fools us. It is simply inadequate to the mere facts—is a product of the study suitable for stuffy class-rooms but unable to thrive under the open sky of concrete reality. It no more displays the workshop of this reality than do printed words in a geography-primer the actual geologic origin of the countries discussed. Truth to tell, the assumption that the source of reality must be Intellect ("Idea"), the articulation of which can be shown in a book, is an absurd relic of Platonic dialectics and Scholasticism which but for the dexterity of one or two German writers would long since have been discarded.

But if Categories, Notions, or Concepts of the Metaphysical kind make so strange a show, why in the name of common sense, it will be asked, were they ever assumed at all? How are they seized in the first instance—the problems of relating them in a Logic, etc., apart? Here we come to an important issue, an issue which enables us to clear the ground grandly. The answer, of course, of Hegelians would be—no such categories, no experience, inner and outer, mental and perceptual, such as we actually have. This be-

ing so, I will first take the case of *Objects*, of "outer" experience and contend that the objectivation of this latter in no way requires us to assume such categories. In other words, Categories, as devices invented to help us to explain the riddle of External Perception, are superfluous. We can explain that portion of the riddle, which they seem to explain, otherwise.

Take the alleged *Category Being*—is it requisite as most simple of the thought-determinations said to "constitute" the object? I reply, it is wholly superfluous; Being in the object is not a thought but a sensation, not a category, pure concept or universal, but a name for the feeling of *self-opposition* (Behmen's contrariety), whereby the subject becomes conscious.¹

The idea of this *sensation* abstracted from the ideas of the other sensations along with which it is had, and fixed by a name becomes in the process a concept. The Subject does not "*think*" its states as existent under a metaphysical or "*transcendental*" concept and so constitute a rudimentarily objective world, but it derives the *empirical* concept "*Being*" from a *felt* world, with the production of which concepts had nothing to do,—the production being due to a super-rational activity in no way resembling intellect. The new Monadism, the quarter in which I believe the true explanation of External Perception to lie, has no need to invent transcendental concepts to account for knowledge. It declares that there are no concepts whatever in things until by "taking together" (con-ceiving) the agreeing phases of the things, we generate them and *then place them* at our leisure in the selfsame things.

There is, in fact, a *native objectivity* in sensation arising from its mode of production, the rushing of the Ego or Subject into manifestation. I am glad to find myself partly in agreement with Mr. Belfort Bax on this count. He, too, though a Categorist, dismisses Being as "alogical," but he does not, I venture to think, yet realise what this important rejection means. It means the concession to the presentation-continuum of that precious objectivity

¹ Jacob Behmen's "doctrine of contrariety" as essential to consciousness, and Fichte's view of the Non-Ego as an output of the Ego, which thereby determines or makes definite itself, may be usefully studied in this connexion.

which is the one element requisite for the success of Associationism in this quarter. Mr. Bax says: "The universal and necessary element which all reality involves is clearly thought into the object. Yet although thought into the object, it is clearly not thought into it by the individual mind, since the latter finds it already given in the object" (*Problem of Reality*, p. 17), and preserves categories, such as Causality and Substance, despite his objection to Being. But surely, Being once conceded to the enemy, the case for the other categories is lost. Association will suffice to round off a crudely into a fully objective world, and that the more easily as inherited ancestral experiences facilitate its task. As I have urged elsewhere: "Not categories, but cerebral monads mediate the fuller objectivation of sensation into the ripe world we know; their activities being passively duplicated in the Subject [central monad] as the infant consciousness dawns. *Nerves and brain wirepull the adjustments of organism to surroundings, and the reflex of this adjustive mechanism in the subject is the very process of the fuller objectivation itself.*"¹ Seeing that for Mr. Bax consciousness viewed from the physical standpoint is "cerebral matter in motion" and arises with the organism in time, he might find the above view not wholly valueless, friendly though it is to Monadism. It is satisfactory, however, to be in a position to assert that my particular form of Monadism admits of inductive proof, a proof which can be readily adduced if required. Indeed, saving certain effective supplementary arguments yet to be inserted, this proof has been already submitted to the critics.

It is well that I should ward off misrepresentation in thus treating of the categories. I was recently taken to task by a careless and I fear not too conscientious critic for insisting in one part of my *Riddle* on psychical atomism and in other parts attacking it. "You cannot," urged this worthy, "get universal connexion out of particulars in which it was not, but, as Mr. Fawcett shows, there are no such particulars in experience (p. 90), and all that science can do is to clear and make systematic a connexion present from the first in every associative conjunction. If therefore (p. 182) the

¹*Riddle of the Universe*, p. 337.

author accepts Mr. Bradley's rejection of atomism he can hardly have understood it. Particulars out of connexion *are* psychical atoms." The critic has not cared to think out the standpoint he so glibly assails. I reject, of course, as a Monadist, all show of psychical atomism proffered as explanatory of my own consciousness, but I equally reject what seem to me those phantoms of the study, those modernised verbal Universals known as "categories." What I posit is a presentation-continuum, the "wholeness" of which reveals the unity of the monad that evolves it. From this whole I maintain that we can derive universals and particulars alike; integration and differentiation of its *aspects* by way of their mutual furtherance and hindrance furnishing the clue. Physiological psychology taken over and made adequate by Monadism enables us to dispense with the category. It should be evident that this view excludes belief in primitive unrelated particulars. All modes of experience are related as modes of a unitary self-revelatory monad. The error of Hegelians is their view of "relations" as the realisation of "Universals" somehow different in kind from the "related terms." I will return to this matter anon.

Let me now glance briefly at the well-known Category of Causality as impugned and set aside by the new Monadism.

What is the pre-Hegelian history of this Category? It is this. Hume in the first place resolved experience into primitively unrelated particulars—shook the whole fabric loose. A causal sequence for him was a time-sequence, the terms of which *seem* to hang necessarily together owing to association. Causality is derivative from our experience of "constant conjunctions" and then thrust, as it were, illusively on some special conjunction. But Kant changes all this. He argues in effect—no causality latent as *pure concept*, no experience of the conjunctions in question at all. It is by way of subsumption under the Category (or rather its *schema*) that determinations of phenomena, i. e., space and time ordered sensations, become objective, universally, and necessarily externalised phases of a real perceptual world. The category minus the phenomena is empty, but the phenomena minus the category are blind. This is the Thought-Theory of Experience, and at first

sight it certainly does seem attractive. But analysis reveals a grave blemish. It was supposed that the Category carried with it a necessity that recemented the fragments into which Experience had fallen for Hume. But see—Kant posits “phenomena” as material for the work of the category. How comes this material into the shape it bears ere it is “subsumed” under the Category. Aye, there’s the rub. A is followed by B, and into this *given sequence* the category reads Necessity.¹ But what of the origination of the terms of the sequence thus treated? Why was A presented along with B in this order? Kant cannot tell us. To say that sensations or “representations” are intuited in a Time-Form is in no way to account for the *detailed order* in which they appear. To explain that order we must surely fall back on the activity conceded to the “transcendental” objects or things-in-themselves. And may not a contingency of at any rate considerable import obtain here? May not the “transcendental objects” or *causæ φαινομενῶν* produce our sensations at random now and then? If so, what is to prevent “Causality” from bestowing a necessary relation on terms arbitrarily, and, may be, contingently originated? Superimposed necessity is a farce. Kant, in short, has on this count failed to confute Hume. Hume’s Causality is of *Empirical* origin, the child of “Association”; Kant’s is an *a priori* condition of experience, but both these kinds of Causality alike presuppose *relatable terms*, in the origination of which contingency may well obtain. The net of the Category is only thrown over two or more terms that happen to have bobbed up in a certain order.

Hegel and others seem to have recognised this as well as other defects of Kant’s theory of Categories. Hence Causality is again revised. It is now made immanent or implicit in phenomena (tardily though we empirical individuals may come to detect it). But in this novel scheme Kant’s standpoint is practically abandoned. Kant had clearly started with a wish to exhibit *multiple* phenomena as somehow thrown at the Ego and then rallied into order by sub-

¹ This inreading is, also, most notably prominent in the case of the so-called categories of *Quantity* and *Quality*.

sumption under a *unitary pure* concept.¹ But when Causality is viewed as immanent in the phenomena at the start, it loses its Kantian standing, being transmuted into the extraordinary fiction of a Concept as *multiple* and *impure* as there are phenomena "realising" it! Kant's mere *function* of the "Transcendental Judgment," designed simply to account for the way in which we "think" given phenomena, is superseded by a *Logical Realism* which has to account for the phenomena themselves. The Concept in the *Critique* idly related what was *brought to it*—now it *energises and manifests in things*. Is this alleged advance on Kant worth penning? The Category in the form in which Kant championed it will not pass muster—has it profited by taking on a new form? Is it easier to understand how B follows A, always and unconditionally, just because a mere Concept is held to relate them immanently? The supposition may be impeached on two main counts: (1) Concepts of the empirical kind which are alone generally admitted are not *dynamic*; why, then, is a transcendental concept to be gratuitously supposed dynamic? Surely if Reason is found incompetent to account for the movement of Reality, as a whole, specially incompetent is this wretched concept Causality to account for the *nisus* behind the myriads of caused events in this world. The dynamics of Reality were doubtless incorrectly fathered by Schopenhauer upon "Will"—an abstraction as empty as is Reason—but his indictment of Hegelian rationalism holds none the less valid for that. (2) The seething *complexity* and *multiplicity*, the wealth of *qualitative variety*, which mark Nature raise further difficulties. On the Hegelian supposition that the *prius* is pure Reason, articulated as in the Logic, the only way of accounting for Nature is to view it as the categories of this pure Reason made concrete, "realising themselves in multiplicity" as the phrase goes. I would as lief try to create a flesh-and-blood man out of a shadow as spin Nature out of such figments. Causality, of course, is made to

¹The categories, observes Kant, are "nothing but the conditions of thinking in possible experience" in the same way as space and time are conditions of the phenomena which get "subsumed" under these categories.

play its part, the IDEA "thinking" innumerable cases of sequence as causal. It is forgotten that the important thing after all is *not that events are, or may be, related "causally" in the "thought" of the "Idea," or of you and me, but that they occur.* The bare occurrence is the point of moment and this occurrence could be effected as well by a *super-rational* Prius as by a rational one such as Hegel's.

This problem of the bare occurrence is, of course, of a piece with that touching the source of "sensation" (the alogical so called) as a whole. To squeeze "sensation" out of Concepts is as impracticable as to derive Nature from Plato's bloodless Universals. I may, however, be asked: "have you, then, any satisfactory theory to proffer?" It is not, however, my business here to construct, but to criticise. I will therefore simply say that in my humble opinion the solution of the riddle of sensations must be sought by way of study of the dynamics of Monads; Monadism incorporating, while interpreting, whatever physiological psychology has to say.

Some way back I was contending that psychical atomism has no necessary connexion with repudiation of Hegelian Universals. And now I must add that "Relations" *where truly primitive* need in no way be *speciallly* exalted as "Thought." There are, in fact, sensations of relation—"transitive parts" of the stream of consciousness to adopt Professor James's phrase—as well as the ordinary recognised sensations or "substantive parts"; both transitive and substantive parts being aspects only of a Monad. The Relations puzzling the Categorist and treated by him in such absurdly heroic fashion are no "Intelligible" orderers of the manifold, but "sensible" phases of the latter on an equal footing with other phases. As such they are *particular* themselves—that is when we dig them out of their context and come to consider them abstractly. And all particulars (as universals) are products of this later abstraction.

Categories, then, in one domain are superfluous, are relics of Logical Realism. If we could not explain External Perception without them, reconsideration of the group would be requisite—but we can. So far so good. But the Dialectic is a chain which cannot afford to have one weak link. Along with rejection of categories in the realm of Nature and Sense must go rejection of those cate-

gories supposed to interpret Nature and Sense. Dialectic cannot begin abruptly where we think about the world we perceive. No longer, for instance, need we view physical science as the "discovery by the human mind of thoughts that are objective in sensible things"—*provided that "thoughts" here mean Concepts made concrete.* The so-called "laws" of nature present no difficulty. They are verbal generalities, and of some, e. g., the first law of Motion, it cannot be said that phenomena exemplify them sensibly at all. Science, indeed, as a whole does not mirror concrete aspects of the concrete given Real, but stands for a conceptual transformation of this Real, wherein names and symbols predominate. Its Generalities only indicate the likenesses and unlikenesses of minor generalities, "outer" facts or "inner" ideas and feelings viewed in aspects mostly relative to our interests, practical, and other. They leave the problem of the *power behind the facts* untouched. They are necessarily inadequate even to the facts and apt to cheat the book-lover with the merest shadow of knowledge.

Touching the rise and growth of intellect, Monadism must again be invoked. But nothing useful can be done unless physiological psychology and evolutionist biology are first called in. It seems clear that the opinion of Schopenhauer is justified by the advance of science. Intellect uprose primarily as servant to the organism, and was conditioned wholly by its needs. Knowledge pursued as end-in-itself is now familiar, but stands for a late stage in the self-assertion of the central monads. Interests, too, rule here, and we note the *absence of uniform logical order* in the modes of self-realisation of these monads. The bearing of Monadism on the standing and development of "Reason" (or rather of those modes of co-ordination of states of consciousness embraced under this general name), is necessarily of high interest and all conclusions of ordinary research, biologic and other, must be overhauled by it previous to adoption. Ordinary science, where really a study of "phenomena," and not, as is so very often the case, an unconscious and blundering Metaphysic as well, deals with surfaces; monadism with the veiled activities which seethe beneath these surfaces. How penetration below these latter is possible I have shown at

length elsewhere;¹ here I must simply reiterate my conviction that the inquiry is both feasible and of leading significance.

A word more on Dialectic, the supposed "method of the self-explicating Idea" as echoed in human thinking at its maturity. The self-diremption and self-movement of the concept is its pre-supposition. Let us place our fingers on the fallacy underlying it. Dr. Stirling has a doubt as to the validity even of the *Logic*. "If the start be but an artifice and a convenience, is it at all ascertained that the means of progress, the dialectic, is any respect better?" Now we may at once vindicate this timely doubt. The truth is that the contradictory moments discerned within concepts—"the knowledge of opposites is one"—are not products of their self-diremption at all. Contrariwise the moments were otherwise posited and merely suspended together by us *in and as* the concepts. In other words, the alleged self-movement or "labor of the Notion" is an illusion; the true movement is ascribable to the primitive non-conceptual phenomena, "outer" and "inner," aspects of which concepts merely indicate. *It is just this flux, stir, and life in phenomena that constitute the real CRUX of Metaphysic.* And here, again, I would suggest that recourse to Monadism is imperative. The seemingly energising concept is an impostor credited with the energy of the phenomena it grew from.

The two-sidedness *at least* of cognitions is generally admitted. It is no special privilege of Dialectic to maintain that A is only A in virtue of not being B, etc. Thus even empiricists may agree with Bain when he urges that the two sides of consciousness "mutually constitute each other." Such views do not further adoption of conceptual dialectic as the world-secret; they have other uses also. A is certainly B *in so far* as B makes it A. Any given mode of consciousness is differently realised in different relations. But between this contention, and the contention that concepts by self-negation, etc., run a universe, yawns a gulf hard to cross.

¹Cf. *Riddle of the Universe*, Part II., Chapter IV. and V., and elsewhere.

And now there must be noted another leading objection to certain current statements of idealism, including panlogism—to their swamping of the individual subject or monad in the interests of a supposed unitary subject of consciousness “in general.” With Hegel the Idea as *prius* is a Unitary pure *reason*; with others who sympathise with him in a manner the *prius* is equally a *unitary* subject of consciousness in which numerical differences, such as empirical subjectivities exhibit, are lost. Thus Mr. Bax urges that “we instinctively feel that the that in us which distinguishes between the object self [mental order] and the object not-self is the subject of consciousness-*in-general* of which self and not-self are the determinations.”¹ I am afraid that this alleged instinct is an endowment of certain philosophers misled by the worship of Universals. Doctors, however, disagreeing, we must fall back on Experience. And Experience acquaints us with states only of our own consciousness, i. e., ourselves. It is doubtless convenient to “deduce” individuals from a Subject (logical, superlogical, etc.) in which multiplicity is not; but the deduction, like other feats of the Speculative Method, smells of the study. Say what one will, the fact remains that “selves” or monads as partially revealed in our experiences are “impervious,” that the I-glow, the individuality of the individual is self-positing and recognised by men, with no system to uphold, as such. The name subject-in-general may indicate a genuine potentiality or background, but whether we admit the latter or not, we must at any rate admit multiple selves. “If the words ‘self,’ ‘ego,’ I, are to be used intelligibly at all they must mean whatever else they do or do not mean a ‘somewhat’ which is self-distinguished not only from every other knowable object, but also from every other possible self” (A. J. Balfour). Here the multiplicity or monad-view stands to its adversary as does fact to problematical inference. Of a *merely* monistic ground we know and can know nothing; but in our individual monads we the conscious thinkers are rooted. I have argued, however, elsewhere, that the

¹ *Problem of Reality*, p. 87.

truth lies in a monistic monadism wherein both sides of the controversy receive recognition. On these lines the ultimate ground of consciousness is not a mere *Unity*, but a *Unity-Plurality* in which all possible numerical diversity is latent or implicit. The individual, in respect of his bare individuality, at any rate, is an *educt* not a *product*. To say that number obtains *explicitly* only in the sphere of the empirical is correct, and were Mr. Bax and his sympathisers to confine themselves to upholding this view, no one need quarrel with them. But the diversity that we know as *explicit* presupposes a ground in which it was *implicit*; otherwise it could not appear at all. It is a prominent Hegelian contention that there is no "appearance" without an "essence" and no "essence" that cannot become "appearance." The admission, while valid, is embarrassing. The "appearance" of numerical diversity in individuals must in consistency be viewed as explication or revelation of numerical diversity in the "essence"—the Universal Subject or Spirit. A *merely* Unitary Subject could not *unfold itself* into a diversity that it never possessed!

To those who dread the unreality of the "labor of the notion," a labor that yields chronic diseases of language, the very name of Metaphysic is apt to prove obnoxious. But to condemn Metaphysic on account of the vagaries of some of its exponents is unwise. And after all, most of us, man of science and votary of common sense alike, are metaphysicians in practice and it remains, therefore, only to determine the best way of organising and testing seemingly inevitable thoughts. The "complete" Inductive Method of Mill may be heartily commended as an instrument for effecting this latter end; the superstition that it is only suitable for ordinary physical and psychological research being dispelled by the results to which it may be shown to lead us. But, be our method what it may, *we must at least take care not to misstate the riddle of the Experience we have to solve*. Experience, let me repeat, is silent as to the Subject "in general"; it reveals "selves" as discrete, the individuality of the individual as self-positing. This supreme fact must not be ignored. *Δις καὶ τρὶς τὸ καλόν*—I am the reality I am aware of, the world is *my* presentment in even a stricter sense than that intended

by Schopenhauer.¹ Of course the idealistic solution of External Perception—the reply to the question how and why is my sense-consciousness produced as I have it—involves inquiries into the ongoings of other monads, but of these ongoings our knowledge must be indirect.

Such, then, are some of the objections which bear, or seem to bear, severely on Hegelianism. All could without doubt be extensively elaborated, and more especially the pessimist indictment of panlogism could be drawn up with far greater effect. The force of this latter in the sphere of "Nature-philosophy" and in that of Hegel's "Objective Reason" in "Philosophy of Mind" is indeed overwhelming. The systems of Schopenhauer and von Hartmann, if too one-sided, are themselves witnesses to the incompetence of panlogism when it descends from the Olympus of Logic into the Hades of actual fact. Much embodied in these systems is unanswerable on current idealist lines and calls for the radical reconstitution of metaphysic. That reconstitution, I believe, and elsewhere I have endeavored to make good my assertion, can only be achieved by abjuring Reason as *prius*, and resorting to a *super-logical*, consciousless, but spiritual, spontaneity—to a *monistic monadology*. It seems probable that in this event many of the riddles of this world, pessimism, the ethical problem, the import of the individual, and so forth, might ultimately come to wear a far more encouraging aspect than they do now.

* * *

Having dealt with the Hegelian panlogism, I take this opportunity of passing some remarks on the "form of panlogism" espoused by the editor of this magazine, and expounded in its general outlines in his lucid and compact *Primer of Philosophy*. Space

¹Schopenhauer, despite his Inductive standpoint, tends to cling to a "Universal" better suited to abstractionists and notion-philosophers—tends to strip his WILL of all inner multiplicity. Yet he very strangely says, "all proper and true existence obtains *only in the individual* . . . this immeasurable outer world has its existence only in the *consciousness* of knowing beings and is consequently *bound up with the existence of individuals which are its bearers*." *Selected Essays*, E. B. Bax, p. 177. Why, then, ground these individuals in a mere unitary Will?

will compel me to consider only its broadest features, and also to ignore many of the points, touching which I am in hearty accord with its author.

Dr. Carus combines a bold empiricism with a quite Hegelian recognition of a World-Reason as the *prius* of mere human perceiving, feeling, and reasoning. Indeed, he strives after "a critical reconciliation of rival philosophies of the type of Kantian *apriorism* and John Stuart Mill's empiricism." All our knowledge flows from experience, but Reason—an "objective" or World-Reason, not "subjective" innate concepts or the like—is the source of this experience and the universality and necessity detected in the relational or formal aspects even of sensations are to be cited, he thinks, in proof of this view. Needless to say that Mill's associationism is a bar to the reconciliation favored by Dr. Carus; hence the latter's treatment of the question of "formal thought" is notably antagonistic to the standpoint of the famous British empiricist. But there is no reason whatever why a thoroughgoing Empiricism should not, with certain modifications, be made perfectly consonant with an Absolute Idealism or Rationalism. Aristotle, who, if not an Absolute Idealist, was well-nigh one,¹ was at the same time an empiricist in so far as the problem of the origin of *human* knowledge in time was concerned.

But though Dr. Carus agrees with Hegel in the belief that Reason is sole *prius*, he is in no way inclined to favor the artificiality of that thinker and his repudiation of the Dialectical Method is obvious from the remark that "the inmost nature of reason is *consistency*, and thus the simplest statement of rational thought is the maxim of sameness formulated in logic in the sentence $A = A$ " (p. 109). Rejecting the Dialectical Method, he rejects apparently with it all hope of *articulating* the rationality immanent in the world-order, the leading ambition, without question, of Hegel. Indeed, failing some such method, I do not see how the attempt would be feasible. Even if, as Dr. Carus urges, "human reason is

¹ "Well-nigh;" because his *ὕλη* or "matter" remains in the last analysis a surd, never wholly resolved into the *IDEA* or "form."

only the reflexion of the world-reason" (p. 117), we are still at a loss to understand how *immanent necessity and connexion* obtain between the moments of this World-Reason, and why it should actually unfold itself just as it does. We must take the unfolding, it appears, as an ultimate fact and abandon all attempts to pen a Logic which shall be one with Ontology.

But here I must advance a criticism which seems to me to possess much force. How does Dr. Carus, lacking a Dialectical Method, know that the World-Spirit which reflects itself in us is *really rational at all*? The Universality and necessity alleged to pervade experience may surely be witnesses not to the mere rationality of the world, but to the workings of a *supra-rational*, spiritual Power? Remember "reflexions" are often of a very faint and misleading character. And it will scarcely be urged that we men, who are not so very far removed from the animals, furnish a *reflecting surface* in any way adequate to the activities of an alleged World-Spirit? May not the processes we term "reason" be merely a transient phase of our becoming—a wretchedly faint reflexion of spiritual activities such as altogether transcend reason? The moonlight reflected at midnight by a murky pool is no worthy representative of the splendor of the sun which is the original source of the light. And poor human reason, I take it, is no worthy representative of the splendor of that *supra-rational* spiritual sun which I have elsewhere termed the Metaconscious. Anyhow the supposition is worth considering.

Dr. Carus terms his standpoint a "monistic positivism," and very properly contrasts it with the mere agnostic positivism of Comte and Littré. He also justly assails the pernicious *ignorabimus* of modern agnostics in general. "The philosophy of these latter days is indeed like a ship run aground. Her helmsmen themselves have declared that further headway is impossible; that philosophical problems in their very nature are insoluble." For "philosophical" I should prefer to write "metaphysical" or "fundamental" problems. Philosophy is flourishing well enough in these latter days, but metaphysic until recently has certainly been at a discount. Still we have a stalwart, if small, crew of metaphysicians

to man the ship even as things stand,—are not the followers of the Germans from Fichte down to Von Hartmann of some account? The Oriental metaphysicians, also, have their followers. But undoubtedly the agnostics and indifferentists poll by far the biggest vote, and I agree with Dr. Carus that the fact is in almost every way to be deplored.

The *New Positivism* represents the excellent principle “that all knowledge, scientific, philosophical, and religious, is a description of facts.” “Laws” and concepts merely refer us to aspects—qualitative, quantitative, etc.—of the concrete real. “The natural processes themselves are reality.” Exactly. *Monism*, it is urged, is the unitary conception of the world, explaining all facts as phases only of one principle, and opposed to the *Henism* which tries to explain facts by way of some one-sided agency, “matter,” etc., borrowed from them. The true explanation must include all facts and not give undue preference to any abstractly viewed set of them. With this I am in hearty accord. But the question arises whether such a Monism is adequate to the situation. The world exhibits not only unity but diversity and we must surely not allow the diversity to be ignored when we discuss the *Prius*. Indeed, the all but universal struggle for existence suggests discreteness *as well as* unity as present in the all-evolving World-Spirit, and it is a *monistic monadology* that I would venture, accordingly, to proffer as the explanation most adequate to the situation. A mere *unitary* Principle is by implication without the germs whence sprout the *Many*. And let me add that the Experience on which Dr. Carus lays such stress invariably exhibits us to ourselves as impervious, self-contained centres of consciousness. However, I have dealt with this point previously.

Dr. Carus holds that the truth of a philosophy may be vindicated by its ethics; by the fact “that people can live according to the maxims derived therefrom.” Surely this view validates the most conflicting standpoints of Asiatic and European philosophy, all of which cannot be true since on the author’s own showing, the “inmost nature” of reason is *consistency*! But waiving this point, I pass on to the ethical ideal which Dr. Carus derives from “sys-

tematised *facts*," to-wit Meliorism. Now Meliorism, of course, is not pessimism; nor again is it a modified optimism. In fact we are told, "That life has *no value in itself*; life is an opportunity for creating values. Life gains in value the more we fill it with *worthy* actions." Meliorism says that it is only prosecution of a moral end that makes life "*worth living*" (p. 6). This devotion to duty is exactly the ideal which inspired the ethics of Fichte, nay, which caused him to represent God as the "moral end" of the universe, as the Absolute Ego triumphant over the non-Ego of its own making. But let us consider this ideal in the present regard.

Turning to page 22 I read, "Errors are children of the mind. There is *neither good nor bad, neither right nor wrong*, neither truth nor falsehood except in mentality." For what then ought the Meliorist to sacrifice himself when he undertakes, let us say, to advocate some great reform which will advance the civilisation of the future, a lofty ideal if ever there was one? For his fellows? Certainly not. Dr. Carus assures us that "progress is accompanied with increased sensibility to pain, so that the average happiness is not increased even by the greatest advance of civilisation" (p. 6). For what then? For the "moral end" of the universe as Fichte would have said? Certainly not, for right and wrong, good and bad, *only exist in our mentality*. It appears, then, that the Meliorist is sacrificing himself merely to a figment of his own imagination, a barren thankless ideal of his own making. Self-sacrifice for the humanity of the future *when that humanity cannot benefit by the act* and there is no moral ideal beyond our own minds to take account of, is surely a huge mistake? Why labor to no purpose? For my part, were I a meliorist in theory, I am afraid that I should prove a very sorry *décadent* in practice!

Meliorism is said to found on "systematised facts," but where, I ask, are the facts? Is it true that life has no value in itself, are there no enjoyments which merit the name, no intellectual pursuits which are attractive enough to be *ends-in-themselves*? Again, life is said to be merely a chance for creating values? But values *for whom*? For ourselves and fellows? No: for meliorism does not find the value of life in reaping pleasures. Nevertheless, a "value"

that does not relieve pain or produce, or tend to produce, pleasure is a thing which I for one confess myself at a loss to understand. The term, in fact, seems meaningless. And similarly the expression "worthy actions" puzzles me. If there is no right outside human minds, and if the giving of pleasures and removal of pains are not the test of worth, what is the meaning of the expression at all? What is the standard of comparison by which all men alike will be content to measure "worth"? To me the only available standard seems utility and this consideration imports, of course, calculations touching the assessment of pleasures and pains.

Very serious in its bearing on morality is Dr. Carus's attitude touching the soul. He views soul and body as inseparable, as abstracts from the same reality. That is to say the activities which to other sentient beings appear as certain cerebral functions are for me my own conscious life; neurosis and psychosis are two sides of one and the same process. Well: this view implies the extinction of my consciousness at death; for the neurosis is then at an end and there is no psychosis separable from a neurosis. Now, I hold with Renan that the loss of the belief in immortality must enervate the morality of, at any rate, the ordinary man. Unless we are to persist consciously after death and that too with a prospect of happiness, it really does seem absurd to worry ourselves with arduous moral efforts here and now. Unless the higher phases of self-culture and altruism are to bear rich fruit for ourselves AND OTHERS in another life or lives, I fail entirely to see why we should vex ourselves here with ceaseless strivings and strugglings, when the cozy nooks of degeneration lie open to us. I am aware that Dr. Carus holds that "true religion is based upon the immortality of the soul" (p. 189), but what is the immortality in which he believes? A mockery in all seriousness! It cannot be that he refers to our *conscious* existence after death, because the body is destined to perish, and body and soul, he asserts, are inseparable. "Christ is actually a living presence in [European] humanity," he urges, pp. 188-189. No, no, not so fast. The Nazarene's body has long ago mouldered into dust, assuming that he ever lived. His soul, therefore, on the lines of monistic positivism has been extinguished.

What is "present in humanity" is not Christ, but *ideas about* Christ, which is a very different matter. For myself, I would not give two-pence for an immortality of this kind, and I have no doubt that the average man in the street will heartily echo my sentiments. What is wanted is not a *metaphorical* existence in somebody's mind, when that somebody happens to think of you, or somebody's character has to be moulded, but a *real conscious* perpetuity in one's own right. Anything less than this is of no account to its possessor.

To turn to the subject of Idealism, I note with interest that Dr. Carus views "all objective existence" as *in itself* subjective, "that which appears to us as a motion is in itself either a feeling or something analogous to feeling." Exactly; this is the point on which I have laid such stress in working out my theory of the Meta-conscious and the new Monadism. The truth is that Subjectivity has many grades, of which what we term reflective self-consciousness and the ordinary direct consciousness are merely two—of special interest to us owing to our position in the universe. As observed by our author, "let us observe and study natural phenomena, and we shall learn something of the souls of other creatures and things" (p. 22). Yes, but it is just in observing these domains that I found my *lower monads*, the very "*souls*" of creatures and things, which Dr. Carus himself is here on the verge of admitting! Our author is, as I know, no friend to Monadology, but he has very nearly stumbled on it here.

I am quite in accord with the author in condemning the "sham" or Mâyâ theory of perception held by so many Hindu thinkers. Nature as we perceive it *is* a revelation, though the activities in our consciousness need not be viewed as more than symbols of the spiritual activities in that wider Nature which lies beyond our consciousness. In my *Riddle of the Universe* I have dealt with this and like points at length.

I think that Dr. Carus unduly narrows the meaning of Idealism when he regards it as the school that questions the "objectivity of our representations." Idealists are of many schools; agnostic, nihilistic, subjective, objective, absolute idealists, etc., are to be met with. The only idea common to these schools is the belief that in

consciousness or in activities akin in nature to consciousness must be sought the entire explanation of the universe. Theories of perception, termed idealistic, differ widely.

There is much in Dr. Carus's tersely written *Primer* on which I should like to dwell, but I must perforce at this point bring my already too lengthy remarks to a close.

EDWARD DOUGLAS FAWCETT.

TORQUAY, ENGLAND.